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It was on May 1, 2004 that Poland - together with Cyprus, Estonia, Czech, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary - became a legał 
member of the European Union. Poland’s membership in the EU-25 has been 
closely connected with the declaration of entering the Euro zonę, as well as 
participation in the common monetary policy within the framework of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).1 Poland, together with its membership 
in the European Union, acąuired the incomplete status of a member-country 
of the EMU and was granted derogation.2 This legał status imposes the obli- 
gation for Poland to fulfill nominał convergence criteria fixed in The Treaty of 
Establishing the European Community. After satisfying the criteria, Poland 
is formally prepared to enter the Euro zonę. It is worth underlining that The 
Treaty does not force any EU member-country to submit a definite datę of 
either its nominał convergence or its joining the EMU. Prior to being eligible 
to join the EMU, the member-states are reąuired to enter the European Mon­
etary System (EMS), and participate in the Exchange Ratę Mechanism, the 
so-called ERM II, for at least two years. The mechanism aims at maintaining 
the stability of the exchange ratę in relation to the Euro. A new mechanism
1 Joining the EMU is not compulsory according to relevant Protocols to Maastricht Treaty. 
Great Britain and Denmark hołd special status, and they are not obliged to enter the EMU. More- 
over, these EU members declared that they did not intend to adopt a common currency. Sweden 
has not been admitted to the EMU because of the failing to satisfy the conditions of the European 
Monetary System participation. Greece was accepted as a EMU member until January 1, 2001, 
because its economy had not converged with the strategie criteria of convergence.
2 “Derogation” is a juridical term which means an abrogation of the power of a law and replace- 
ment of it by another law. A derogation can be removed/withdrawn/ if the country with derogation 
fails to satisfy the agreed criteria i.e. Maastricht convergence criteria.
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was put into practice on January 1,1999, replacing the old European Monetary 
System [Królak-Werwińska, 2005, 28-29], The new mechanism focuses mainly 
on the reduction of excessive fluctuation of exchange rates in relation to the 
administratively fixed ratę of exchange. After two years of ERM II participa- 
tion and meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria, candidate countries 
would be approved as legał members of the Euro zonę (EMU).
In the light of the Conoergence Report delivered by the European Com- 
mission, nonę of the countries admitted on May 1, 2004 (except Estonia and 
Lithuania), did fulfill all convergence criteria (Table 1).
Table 1. Indicators of economic convergence (except the exchange ratę criterion) in 2003
Member country Inflation %






Czech Republic 1.8 4.7 -5.0 37.9
Estonia 2.0 - 0.3 4.8
Cyprus 2.1 5.2 -5.2 72.6
Latvia 4.9 5.0 -2.0 14.7
Lithuania -0.2 4.7 -2.6 21.4
Hungary 6.5 8.1 -5.5 59.9
Malta 2.6 4.7 -5.2 73.8
Poland 2.5 6.9 -5.6 47.2
Slovenia 4.1 5.2 -2.3 30.8
Slovakia 8.4 5.1 -3.9 44.5
Reference value 2.4 6.4 -3.0 60.0
Source: Conoergence Report 2004. The European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany 2004
The Report says that only five countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, met the inflation criterion. Poland fulfilled the 
inflation criterion only in the period between August 2002 and April 2004. 
The HICP (harmonized index of consumer prices) was only 0.7% in 2003, and 
soared to 3.6% in 2004 [ECB, Monthly Bulletin, 2005, 68-69]. In the first half 
of 2005, the HICP reached around 4.5%, being far above the reference value.
The Stability and Growth Pact establishes the reduction of budget deficits 
below 3% of GDP. The criterion was satisfied only by Estonia, Latvia, Lithua­
nia, Slovenia. The budget deficit stood in the Czech Republic at 12.6% of the 
GDP, 6.2% in Hungary, 9.6% in Malta and 3.9% in Poland. The public deficit as 
a portion of the GDP, exceeded 60% of that just in two countries, i.e. in Malta 
(73.8%) and Cyprus (72.6%). Six of the countries analyzed above were the 
members of ERM II - Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia 
[www.europa.eu.int/euro].
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Compliance with the criteria mentioned above seems to be out of Poland’s 
reach by the end of the current decade at least, the main cause of the lag being 
the crisis of the public finances in Poland, which causes the country to fail to meet 
the budget deficit criterion. Moreover, it is clearly visible that some of the EU 
countries are unwilling to welcome new members in the Euro zonę very soon.
There are a rangę of scenarios of Poland’s accessing the EMU described in 
the Polish literaturę. The most optimistic version predicts Poland’s joining the 
EMU in the period 2008-2010. The most feasible option, however, seems to be 
in the years 2012-2014 [Małecki, 2004, 142-143].
The synthetic balance of benefits and costs of Poland’s joining 
the Euro zonę
The fundamental decision to give up the national currency and to join the 
Euro zonę is a challenge of historical importance for the Polish society at the 
beginning of the 21st century. The following analysis focuses on economic costs 
and benefits of an early EMU entry that are pivotal for the further process 
of Polish integration with the EU.3 There are a lot of controversies over the 
issue. It is necessary to underline here that a complete assessment of costs and 
benefits of Poland’s EMU membership is not only difficult, but even impossible, 
given that a lot of elements needed for such an analysis are immeasurable.4 
Some of the costs and benefits are highly prospective. Hence, the balance of 
Poland’s membership in the Euro zonę brings closer the probable costs of in­
tegration and expected benefits.
3 Additionally, implementation of a common currency and resignation from an independent 
monetary policy that are tightly connected to specific costs and benefits of political and social 
naturę, in short-term as well as in long-term, will not be taken into consideration in this paper.
4 There is a lot of subjectivism in the economic analyses depending on the authors’ political 
biases.
Benefits of the membership in the Euro zonę
Expected benefits of Poland’s membership in the Euro zonę are linked most 
of all to the increase in microeconomic rationality, which may offer an impulse 
to increase macroeconomic efficiency, economic growth and greater economic 
welfare. There exists a generał agreement on the sources of the aforementioned 
efficiency benefits. The first one stems from the disappearance of transaction 
costs relating to the exchanges of national currency (abolition of the Zloty/Euro 
exchange ratę). The second cause of the effectiveness accumulation is the
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elimination of the exchange ratę risk. The exchange ratę and risk premium 
that are cut out to the members of the Euro zonę should result in lower inter- 
est rates. The benefits will now be discussed in morę detail.
The most evident and measurable benefits - sometimes called direct benefits 
— of joining the common currency is the abandonment of transaction costs when 
exchanging the Zloty to the Euro and vice versa. Although these costs are smali 
indeed - from 0.25 to 0.5% of the EU’s GDP, they affect the costs of production 
activities of enterprises [de Grauve, 2001, 70]. The estimations of the direct 
costs in Poland are around 0.14% of the GDP [Borowski, 2003]. Transaction 
costs are deadweight losses, as the customer gets nothing for the expendi- 
ture incurred. The transaction costs include direct financial costs, which put 
a wedge between a purchase and sale of foreign currency, fees and insurance 
costs. Moreover, there are also administrative costs such as exchange ratę risk 
management costs, financial administrative costs, etc.
The elimination of this “shoe leather cost” (the additional time and en- 
ergy spent on currency exchange transactions) and “menu cost” (the cost of 
alteration of tables with exchange rates, advertisements, calculations, stock 
exchange ąuotations) will result in social and economic benefits of much impor- 
tance, although they are difficult to assess. This will lead to increased efficiency 
in the allocation of scarce resources — especially the human factor — and will 
accelerate the economic growth. The National Bank of Poland estimates the 
elimination of transaction cost to generate the economic growth in Poland of 
about 0.21% [Conuergence Report, 2004, 47],
The benefit of pivotal importance is the disappearance of currency conver- 
sion risk in relation to the Euro and the reduction of insurance costs.
Currency risk stems from the fluctuation of the exchange ratę, in particular, 
unexpected devaluation or revaluation - which lead to the diminution of assets 
value or the increase in the value of obligations translated into national cur­
rency in relation to its expected value. Economic units may generate losses as 
an effect of exchange ratę change between the moment of entering a transac­
tion and the moment of finalizing a transaction or in effect of exchange ratę 
alteration between the invoicing and receiving the payment (transaction risk) 
[Bajer, Grzelak, Zabielski, 1993],
Poland’s membership in the Euro zonę will minimize investment risk. This 
alone should generate a flow of foreign direct investment. A stable exchange 
ratę will stimulate the development of commercial exchange with the EU-15 
countries, greater Capital accumulation, and in effect - through the multiplier 
mechanism - an augmentation of the GDP and economic welfare.5
6 Estimations of the IMF indicate the impulse to foreign commerce of about 15% to 30% and 
20% to economic growth in the period of 20 years, as the result of entering the Euro zonę.
CONTROYERSIES OVER COSTS AND BENEFITS... 15
The reduction on national interest rates is perceived as one of the greatest 
benefits of Poland’s membership in the Euro zonę. Exchange ratę risk is one of 
the three elements determining the level of national interest ratę. The lower 
the risk, the greater will be the reduction of interest rates. The reduction 
of exchange ratę risk premium included in interest rates enables economic 
units to get morę money resources at a lower price (interest ratę). Research 
conducted by the National Bank of Poland indicates the reduction of long- 
term interest rates of about 1.5-2.0 percentage points after Poland joins the 
European Monetary Union. The level of the interest ratę - relatively Iow in 
the opinion of the author of the paper - reflects the premium of exchange ratę 
risk estimated under the assumption that Poland would not become a member 
of the EMU at all [see de Grauve, 2004; Lutkowski; Krajewski, 2003; Tchorek, 
2004; The Accessing..., 2004; Czyżewski et all, 2003].
It is worth noticing that some economists point to the reduction of exchange 
ratę risk as a factor eliminating, to a large extent, the uncertainty of the entre- 
preneur, hence increasing their profits. This refers particularly to managers 
who are risk-averse. Notwithstanding, the assertion is repealed. Along with 
the theory of risk-preferring entrepreneur, significantly augmented profits 
are feasible only when the exchange ratę fluctuates considerably. Parallel 
arguments can be madę about the behavior of consumers. When there is price 
uncertainty consumer surplus is higher than when price is certain. Consum­
ers increase their demand when a price is Iow and stable and vice versa [de 
Grauve, 2001, 73-74],
Poland’s accession to the Euro zonę, which would cause an alteration of the 
environment of economic units’ activity, is expected to initiate a numerous 
adjustment processes. The adjustment is to produce particular benefits that 
would be visible no sooner than in a long perspective time, and many of them 
may not emerge or be of significant importance.
Substantial benefits of the reduction of exchange ratę risk are foreseen in 
the area of prices. Many economists expected the elimination of the risk to 
foster the effectiveness of the price mechanism and conseąuently increase the 
rationality of the resource allocation within national as well as integrated 
economies. The introduction of the Euro was expected to result in a conver- 
gence of price differences within the European Monetary Union.6 Significant 
variations in prices of the same goods in member-countries reflect market in- 
effectiveness and force consumers to suffer shoe-leather cost when searching 
for markets where goods are relatively (to disposable income) or absolutely 
cheaper. Moreover, a common currency makes comparability of prices pos-
6 This assertion proved to be untrue as prices rosę by about 0.5-2.0 percentage points after 
implementing the Euro in the EMU countries. The phenomenon of price soaring in catching-up 
countries is explained in Balassa-Samuelson effect.
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sible, which, on the one hand, increases supply-side competition, and, on the 
other one, increases the size of the market. The prices in the Euro, being morę 
transparent, rationalize the choices of suppliers and recipients, facilitate the 
economic calculations and - probably - increase competition on the supply- 
side, which should produce greater utility to consumers.
Poland’s membership in a common financial market enables Polish economic 
agents to access wider and cheaper financial resources. This will improve Capi­
tal allocation through greater risk diversification. Intensified competition is 
expected in the domestic market. This alone should bring the financial service 
costs down in Poland.
When eliminating exchange ratę risk, uncertainty and, thus, the risk of run- 
ning a business should conseąuently decrease. This may result in increasing 
entrepreneurship and innovation, especially in those companies that previ- 
ously were risk-averse [de Grauve, 2001, 73-74].
It has been commonly accepted in the theoretical arguments that the dele- 
tion of exchange ratę uncertainty exerts a positive effect on the dynamics of 
GDP. Lower exchange risk has a twofold outcome: it lowers real interest ratę 
- which, through the multiplier effect, induces economic growth and increases 
the ratę of return on investment. The relation interest ratę — national income 
growth is analyzed within IS-LM model by Hick and Hansen. However, numer- 
ous research into the relation of the dynamics of the exchange ratę, economic 
growth, investment and foreign trade in the EMU countries showed that the 
relationship was not statistically significant.7 Therefore, the strength of the 
argument for automatic acceleration of Poland’ s economic growth after joining 
the EMU is fading away.
7 Compare P. de Grauve [2001, 79-81] and the IMF research. In such a settled context, there 
are immense doubts both of methodical and essential provenience emerging from the official state- 
ments of the National Bank of Poland. Declarations that “the access to common monetary union 
will make a stable medium-term economic growth of about 0.21-0.42 percentage point, and higher 
GDP by around 5.6-11.8% in 2030 in relation to thebase scenario” and “the medium-run growth of 
individual consumption will soar by 0.16-0.37 percentage points after Poland’s joining the EMU, 
and in 2030 the level of consumption in relation to base scenario will be higher by around 4.4-10 
percentage points” [Report, 2004, 75] are strikingly authoritarian. It is worth mentioning that the 
EMU countries have recorded the lowest economic growth within a few recent years.
There is no doubt that there is a wide rangę of theoretical potential stemming 
from Poland’ s membership in the EMU in the long run. However, it is hard to 
distinguish all of the long-term development determinants in practice.
Summing up, it needs to be stated that the probability of credible benefits 
of Poland’ s membership in the Euro zonę - lower transaction costs, improved 
effectiveness of price mechanism, morę transparent prices, bonuses from com­
mon financial market participation - are highly feasible.
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Costs of Poland’s entering the Euro zonę
The costs of a common currency are mainly those affecting macroeconomic 
effectiveness of an economy.
The transference of sovereignty in monetary and exchange ratę policy is the 
fundamental cost of joining the Euro zonę. The National Bank of Poland loses 
its independence to influence freely the level of money supply, the interest ratę 
and the exchange ratę. These powers are transferred to the European Cen­
tral Bank (ECB). The monetary policy is “common” and run by the ECB. The 
direction of monetary and exchange ratę policy in the Euro zonę is based on 
indicators of the EMU area as a whole. Member-countries of the Euro zonę do 
not influence directly the policy (they get indirectly involved in the monetary 
policy decision making).
But, economic situations in member-countries and regions vary significantly 
in the case of asymmetric shocks.8 Therefore, introducing monetary policy In­
struments to neutralize the shock is, in principle, impossible. The burden of the 
adjustment processes falls on the member-countries concerned. The package 
of stabilizing actions is a combination of labor market adjustment tools and 
fiscal policy. The effectiveness of the actions depends heavily on the elasticity 
of prices and wages (in particular, the downward elasticity), as well as on the 
deregulation of the labor market. The lack of efficient anti-shock mechanisms 
and the tendency for expansionary fiscal policy (particularly, the increase in 
the government expenditure) do lead to high adjustment costs in the case of 
asymmetric shocks [see Fahrholtz, Mohl, 2003].
8 The term ‘asymmetric shocks’ embraces unexpected and impetuous disturbance of real 
processes in economies of integrated countries spreading with uneven intensity in the particular 
countries. These kinds of perturbation result in chronic trade and monetary surpluses in some 
group of countries and persistent trade and monetary shortage in another group of countries. 
Moreover, asymmetric shocks mean lack of convergence of business cycles in particular regions 
of monetary union - economic boom in some area and recession in another [Lutkowski, 110-111). 
And, symmetric shocks affect economies of monetary union all in the same direction and with 
similar magnitude. In this case the Instruments of the common monetary policy are potent in 
macroeconomic stabilization of an economy.
It should also be noted that particular countries differ in the bundle of 
economic aims, and especially in preferences for the level of inflation and un- 
employment. One group of countries is sensitive to inflation, another group is 
focused on unemployment. In terms of a centrally adopted monetary and ex- 
change ratę policy, economic aims of the EMU are not necessarily in linę with 
national interests of particular member-countries. The EMU prefers stability 
of prices rather than lower unemployment. Therefore, the European Central 
Bank faces a dilemma of choice of monetary Instruments. If we assume that, 
for instance, there is high inflation in Italy and excessive unemployment in
18 STANISŁAW LIS
Germany, it raises a concern for the use of the same monetary tool - inter- 
est ratę - to achieve the contradictory aims, i.e. reduced demand in Italy and 
stimulated demand in Germany. As Friedman M. rightly ascertained, the 
same monetary policy run by the ECB for countries in different phases of the 
business cycle is mistaken. It is worth adding that shaping the same mon­
etary policy for countries of a different level of socioeconomic development is 
highly difficult, the last thesis being of crucial importance as Poland’s level 
of economic development in the GDP per capita is merely 40% of the EU-15 
GDP (before expansion, May 10, 2004) and 19% of the unemployment ratę is 
the highest in the EU.
Moreover, joining the EMU means a loss of the exchange ratę as the instru­
ment of business cycle stabilization in case of asymmetric shocks in Poland. 
The value of the alternative cost9 of losing the independence of monetary and 
exchange ratę policy depends inter alia on the choice of alternative adjust- 
ment mechanisms10 that would neutralize the results of potential demand 
and supply shocks [Convergen.ee Report, 2004, 89—90], The risk of immense, in 
particular, external, shocks when no monetary sovereignty exists may result 
in enormous costs, which are very tough to assess.
9 The microeconomic costs of EMU membership are administrative costs, costs of institutional 
modification, costs of introducing new Computer systems of operational processes, costs of train- 
ing, and other adaptation costs.
10 That is automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy.
An overvalued exchange ratę of the Zloty before entering the EMU is of 
great danger. The benefits of higher competitiveness of Polish export through 
a depreciation of the domestic currency are to be forgone in the European 
market if Poland joins the EMU.
Summing up, the comparative analysis performed by Western and Polish 
economists indicates that the balance of Polish membership in the EMU is 
positive in the long run. Poland’s road to the Euro zonę seems to be compli- 
cated due to the lack of nominał and real convergence, as well as significant 
resistance within the society.
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